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iv

STATEMENT QF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Appellant seeks review of the directed verdict entered on
November 3, 1995.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this

matter pursuant to § 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS QF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting a directed

verdict for Defendant?

The standard of appellate review:

(a) The evidence must be examined in the light most favorable
to the losing

party and,

if this examination

provides a

reasonable basis in the evidence and inferences to support
judgment in favor of the losing party, a directed verdict must
be reversed.
(b)

A directed verdict must be reversed unless, as a matter

of law, reasonable minds could not differ on the facts.
(c)

Where there is any evidence that raises questions of

fact, no matter how improbable, judgment as a matter of law
must be reversed.
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co. f 905 P. 2d 297, 299 (Utah App.
1995); Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Rec. Ass'n, 845 P.2d 242,
243 (Utah 1992); Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners
Ass'n v. Graystone Pinesr Inc. r 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982); Nay
v. General Motors Corp.r 850 P.2d 1260, 1261 (Utah 1993); Anderson
v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432, 434 (1973).
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Plaintiff alleged breach of contract or warranty and tort theories
against Defendant.

(R. at 2-10 and 193-203.)

Plaintiff argued

against and objected to entry of a directed verdict.
757. )

Plaintiff

objected

to

the

proposed

Conclusions of Law and Directed Verdict.
2.

(R. at 716-

Findings

of

Fact,

(R. at 231-240. )

Whether there was evidence of Plaintiff's damages?

The

standard of appellate review and citation to the record showing the
issue was preserved on appeal are the same as for paragraph 1.
3.
relied

Whether there was evidence that Plaintiff reasonably
on

the negligent

misrepresentation

by

Defendant?

The

standard of appellate review and citation to the record showing the
issue was preserved on appeal are the same as for paragraph 1.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 50(a), Utah R. Civ. P., provides as follows:
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the
evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the
event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had
not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not
granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all
parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion
for a directed verdict is effective without the assent of the
jury.
NATURE QF THE CASE
In 1993, Plaintiff filed this action to recover the damages it
sustained when seven computer components were destroyed as the
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result of high temperatures during an air conditioning failure on
December 25, 1991. Defendant provided all service and maintenance
for Plaintiff's air conditioning systems, including the computer
room system that operated twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.
Defendant installed an automatic backup system to automatically
prevent the loss of air conditioning in the computer room.
In

reliance

on

a

conversation

with

Defendant,

Plaintiff

understood the backup system was operational on December 25 and,
for the first time ever, did not require employees to continuously
work

in

the

computer

room

on

Christmas.

Plaintiff

assigned

employees to visit the computer room at hourly intervals.

While

the computer room was unattended, the air conditioning failed and
the backup system did not automatically maintain air conditioning.
More

than

seven

temperatures.

computer

components

were

destroyed

by

high

Defendant argued that Plaintiff knew that the auto

backup project was incomplete and that Defendant never represented
that the backup was fully operational.
On August 7 and 8, 1995, Plaintiff presented its case-inchief.

On the third day of trial, August 9, the trial court

granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict before Defendant
began its case-in-chief or any jury deliberations.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
During

1991,

Plaintiff

provided

health

services to over a thousand customers.

care

management

(R. at 442.)

Russell

Loudon was assigned direct responsibility for Plaintiff's computer
room during 1991.

(R. at 443.)

Mr. Loudon was hired by one of

Alta Health Strategies1 predecessor companies in 1982.

(R. at 352-

353. ) Mr. Loudon started in the computer room as a graveyard shift
operator, but within three and one-half years Mr. Loudon had been
promoted to manager of the computer room.

(R. at 352 and 354. )

Plaintiff's

the

computer

room

was

built

at

same

time

Plaintiff's building was constructed in approximately 1980.
355-356 and 373.)
in August of 1993.

that
(R. at

Mr. Loudon ceased his employment with Plaintiff
(R. at 362 and 441.)

Through 1991, Plaintiff obtained virtually all of its computer
equipment from Unisys.

(R. at 360 and 443.)

Jim Bolinder, a

Unisys service engineer, was primarily responsible for maintenance
and upkeep of the computer systems and equipment.

(R. at 357-358. )

Mr. Bolinder worked the graveyard shift, since it was the only time
acceptable to take the computer system down for maintenance.
at 358.)

Unisys' responsibilities

were computer

(R.

maintenance,

repair, and if Plaintiff was adding equipment, Unisys would tell
Plaintiff what to actually purchase from Unisys.
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(R. at 359.) The

Unisys field engineers would perform daily maintenance under a
service contract between Plaintiff and Unisys.

(R. at 359.)

Plaintiff purchased increasing amounts of more sophisticated
Unisys computer equipment as its business grew until, by 1991,
Plaintiff had thousands of customer accounts on its computers.
(R. at 355-356 and 361.)

For many years through 1991, the Unisys

computers operated twenty-four hours a day, fifty-two weeks a year.
(R. at 356, 443 and 447.)

Certain computer components were heat-

sensitive and, therefore, the air conditioning operated twenty-four
hours a day, 365 days a year.

(R. at 402. ) The target temperature

for the computer room was a few degrees within 72 degrees.

(R.

444.)

Mr.

Downtime was very critical to Plaintiff.

(R. 409.)

Loudon prided himself on having the computers running at least 98%
of the time.

(R. at 379-380. )

99.2% of the time.

One year the computers were up

(R. at 380.)

For many years prior to 1991, Plaintiff had assigned employees
to work in the computer room twenty-four hours a day, fifty-two
weeks a year.

(R. at 427 and 444.)

During

1991, Plaintiff

experienced a number of computer failures that caused computer
downtime.

(R. at 367, 379, 402, and 428.)

The most common

computer failures were power outages that caused the loss of air
conditioning (R. at 367, 379, 402-404, and 428.)

Mr. Loudon and

other managers decided to make the computers less vulnerable to air

5

conditioning

failures.

(R. at 379.)

Plaintiff's goal was to

minimize the downtime from power outages.

(R. at 404. )

Nbne of

Plaintiff's employees have experience, training or knowledge of air
conditioning.
1991,

all

(R. at 444 and 692-693. )

air

conditioning

service

For the ten years up to

and

maintenance

Plaintiff's computer room was performed by Defendant.
444, 647, and 693. ) While Defendant worked on the
air

conditioning,

Plaintiff

would

communicate

work

for

(R. at 357,

computer room
with

Defendant

informally, the employees usually talked to each other in the hall
or in one of the offices.
meetings

or

written

(R. at 450. )

records

between

the

There were no special
parties

during

the

switchover project and the customary practice in the years up to
1991 was that Defendant did not have meetings with Plaintiff or
send documents back and forth. (R. at 451.)
Mr. Loudon asked whether Defendant could install an automatic
backup for the computer room air conditioning system.

(R. at 377

and 381-382.) Defendant represented that it could design and build
an auto backup system.

(R. at 377.)

Mr. Loudon did not know how

the auto backup system would work until after it failed in December
of 1991.

(R. at 384-385.)

Defendant admitted that it knew that

Plaintiff did not have any employees that were knowledgeable and
experienced in air conditioning.
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(R. at 592. )

Defendant knew

Plaintiff was relying on Defendant for the automatic backup work.
(R. at 591.)
In 1991, Defendant prepared a Proposal-Contract for the air
conditioning auto backup for the computer room.

(Ex. 5.)

The

project to design and install an automatic switchover system was
called the changeover.

(Ex. 5.)

for the changeover project.

Defendant agreed to charge $6,650

(Ex. 5.)

The switchover project was

started by Defendant near the end of 1991.
a

second

and

larger

project

by

(R. at 445. ) There was

Defendant

to

replace

one

of

Plaintiff's air conditioning chillers underway at the end of 1991.
(R. at 445 and 571-572.)

Mr. Loudon was primarily responsible for

the auto backup project performed by Defendant.

(R. at 418. )

Prior to December 25, Mr. Loudon understood the switchover project
was nearly finished by Defendant, because the project was supposed
to have automatically switched over on December 25 and all that
remained was installation of indicator lights.

(R. at 437.)

In the past, for every holiday, Plaintiff had always assigned
computer operators to work, including Christmas day.
and 447. )

(R. at 408

Before December 25, Mr. Loudon asked his supervisor,

Kent Broadhead, whether he could give the computer room operators
time off for Christmas.

(R. at 362, 408, and 447.)

Mr. Broadhead

had

room

promotion

been

director.

the

computer

(R. at 440.)

manager

before

his

to

After Plaintiff had experienced a number
7

of air conditioning

failures, Mr. Broadhead had asked that an

automatic switchover be installed to avoid any manual intervention
should an air conditioning failure occur in the computer room.
at 445-446.)

(R.

Mr. Broadhead agreed that computer operators could

have time off on Christmas, if the switchover project allowed the
computer room to be unmanned.

Mr. Loudon confirmed this with

Defendant, and agreed to monitor the computers at regular intervals
throughout the day.

(R. at 408, 447, and 449.)

Mr. Broadhead met

and confirmed with Mr. Loudon three separate times that the auto
switchover was working before leaving the computer room unmanned on
December 25.

(R. at 451 and 508.)

Defendant would talk to Mr. Loudon two to three times per week
about

the

two

air

conditioning

projects.

(R.

at

413. )

Nevertheless, Mr. Loudon did not really have a good understanding
of the mechanism of the switchover.

(R. at 413. )

Mr. Loudon did

understand that the air conditioning would switch over if there was
a problem.

(R. at 408. ) The only instructions Mr. Loudon had from

Defendant were that the changeover would switch over in the event
of a failure and the operators only had to observe a panel with
indicator lights, but this light panel would not be finished until
later.

(R. at 413-414, 423 and 437.)

In the computer

room

conversation with Defendant, Mr. Loudon did not recall any mention
of the mechanical or electrical mechanisms of the switchover.

8

(R.

at 415. ) Mr. Loudon did not recall the computer room conversation,
but he certainly understood that the changeover would switch over.
(R. at 432.)
Relying on his conversation with Defendant, Mr. Loudon gave
the computer operators part of Christmas day off.
and 414. )

(R. at 408, 412

The employees were allowed to leave the computer room

unmanned, but operators were required to visit the computer room at
hourly intervals on December 25.

(R. at 408 and 414. ) Mr. Loudon

could not recall being told that the changeover would switch over
until or unless there was a power hit, since upon mention of power
hits Mr. Loudon would have felt uncomfortable not having the room
staffed where power hits were the most common problem.
427.)

Defendant's employee could

not recall whether

(R. at
he told

Plaintiff that the switchover would work except for power failures.
(R. at 579.)
Mr. Loudon arrived at the computer room shortly before 4:00
p.m. on December 25, 1991.

(R. at 407.)

Mr. Loudon discovered

that there had been an air conditioning failure, since the room was
at 95-96 degrees and the computer alarms, whistles and lights were
activated.

(R. at 367, 372, 407, and 422-423.)

Mr. Loudon first

called and requested emergency service from Defendant.
409.)

(R. at

By the time Defendant arrived, the air conditioning was

operating.

(R. at 410.)

9

Jim Bolinder was dispatched by Unisys to the computer room on
December 25 for fatal system errors from over-temperature problems.
(R. at 614.)

Mr. Bolinder's notes showed that the temperature in

the computer room went up to 95 degrees.

(R. at 617. )

At least

five HDAs were having problems on December 25, but Mr. Bolinder got
the computers up and running.

(R. at 617-618.)

On December 26,

Mr. Bolinder found three HDAs in the computer room had crashed or
had fatal errors.

(R. at 618.)

In Mr. Bolinder's opinion the

high temperatures on December 25 caused the excessive number of HDA
failures.

(R. at 640-642.)

Trial Exs. 2 and 3 were the customer service orders written up
by the service engineers to specifically bill Plaintiff for service
or repair.

(R. at 614.)

Mr. Bolinder wrote up Ex. 2 for the

December 25 service call, since it was outside of the maintenance
agreement between Plaintiff and Unisys.

(R. at 615.)

Plaintiff

was charged $933.46 for the services performed by Mr. Bolinder on
December 25.

(R. at 616. )

Ex. 3 was the customer service order

for a service call on December 29 for two HDAs that required
maintenance.

(R. at 616. ) The amount charged to Plaintiff for the

work in Ex. 3 was $673.50.

(R. at 616.)

David English was employed by Plaintiff as the director of
facilities, planning and support from 1989 to 1995.

(R. at 644.)

Mr. English signed trial Ex. 5, Defendant's Proposal-Contract, for
10

the auto switchover system project.

(R. at 646. )

Mr. English

supervised the air conditioning for Plaintiff's buildings, but not
Plaintiff's computer room.

(R. at 645.)

charge of the computer room in 1991.

Mr. Broadhead was in

(R. at 645.)

Mr. Loudon was

in charge of making sure that the work on the switchover system
described

in Ex. 5 was completed.

(R. at 647.)

Mr. English

regularly worked with Defendant's service employees assigned to
work on Plaintiff's air conditioning.

(R. at 648-649.)

Mr.

English did not have a detailed understanding of the switchover
system.

(R. at 651-652.)

Before Mr. English left for a week of Christmas vacation,
there was a systems failure and the changeover did not switch over.
(R. at 653-654.)

Mr. English asked one of Defendant's two service

employees the reason that the changeover had not automatically
switched over and the employee told Mr. English the switchover was
95 to 99% finished, but Defendant was waiting for an electronic
part.

(R.

at

654. )

Mr.

English

had

the

discussion

with

Defendant's employee in the hall right outside Mr. Broadhead's
office.

(R. at 654. )

of the discussion.

Mr. Broadhead was in a meeting at the time

(R. at 654. ) Mr. English said "are you waiting

to see Kent [Broadhead], or do you want me to go in with you to
talk to Kent?"

(R. at 654. )

The employee said he would stay and

talk to Mr. Broadhead and, therefore, Mr. English left.
11

(R. at

654. ) Mr. Broadhead was never told by Defendant before December 25
that the auto switchover was not working.

(R. at 450-451 and 461-

462. )
Mark Bryner has been an electrical and mechanical engineer for
nearly fifty years.

(R. at 664-666.)

Mr. Bryner reviewed all

available drawings and diagrams and investigated Plaintiff's air
conditioning, including the auto switchover system. (R. at 670.)
Mr. Bryner explained that one of the two main parts of the auto
switchover was the restart element.

(R. at 681.)

The restart was

a push button before 1992, but after 1992 the restart was automatic
once Defendant merely connected two wires or made a "jumper."
at 682-683. )

(R.

There was no mechanical or electrical engineering

reason to wait to make the restart automatic; it could have been
done on the first day of the project.

(R. 685. )

The old and new

indicator-light panels were not necessary for the auto restart. (R.
686.)

The indicator panel had nothing to do with either the

restart or changeover parts of the switchover system.
Dale
Plaintiff's

Brown

was

the

sales

account.

Unisys

employee

(R. at

523-524.)

(R. at 691.)

responsible
Mr. Brown

for
was

involved in the replacement of Unisys computer equipment after
Christmas 1991.

(R. at 528.) Unisys head disk assemblies ("HDAs")

were components of Plaintiff's computer system.

(R. at 526.)

An

HDA is an assembly of aluminum platters that store information that
12

has been processed and generated by the computer.
459.)

(R. at 388 and

An HDA is not generically different from a disk drive.

at 526.)
designed

(R.

The Unisys HDAs in Plaintiff's computer system were not
to operate where temperatures exceeded

90 degrees or

temperatures increased by more than five degrees per hour.
621-622. )

Within

temperatures.

one day,

(R. at 428.)

three HDAs had

crashed

(R. at

from

high

Seven to nine HDAs were damaged and

replaced by Unisys within one month of December 25.

(R. at 459,

508, and 619-620.) Unisys repaired some of the HDAs.

(R. at 529.)

The loss of air conditioning

on December

25 caused

excessive

temperatures that damaged HDAs and the HDAs had to be replaced.
(R. at 400.)
Under the maintenance contract between Plaintiff and Unisys,
if

an

HDA

failed

and

was

damaged,

within

the

agreement, Unisys replaced the HDA at its cost.

terms

of

the

(R. at 398 and

470. ) There was really no difference between the service agreement
and a warranty agreement.

(R. at 553. ) Unisys had replaced HDAs

that failed during the months preceding December 25, 1991 free-ofcharge each and every time.

(R. at 532 and 553.)

Unisys replaced

two of the nine damaged HDAS at its own expense or under warranty.
(R. at 460 and 620. ) The reason Unisys replaced two of the damaged
HDAs at its own expense or under warranty was that any HDAs that
had not logged any errors in the thirty days before December 25

13

would have been damaged by heat*

(R. at 460.)

Only two HDAs had

logged errors before December 25 that were replaced by Unisys at
its own expense.

(R. at 460.)

Of the approximately 150-200 HDAs in the Unisys computer room
on December 25, one-half to two-thirds were the middle-aged model,
No. 9494-24.

(R. at 531, 533, and 613.)

There were approximately

twenty-four of the newest HDA model No. 9730.
613.)

(R. at 535, 538, and

For many years, Plaintiff had continually purchased and

installed the newest and most advanced models of computer equipment
from Unisys.

(R. at 360-361 and 525.)

Plaintiff tried to stay on

the leading edge of computer equipment and, when Mr. Loudon was
terminated, the newest Unisys computer used by Plaintiff was one of
only sixteen in the world.

(R. 361.)

Plaintiff would be one of

the first to buy new Unisys HDAs as the latest version came out.
(R. at 361 and 527.)
The middle-aged HDAs, No. 9494-24, were larger, slower, and
more expensive than the newest model 9730 HDA.
535.)

(R. at 525 and 534-

The seven 9494-24 HDAs damaged on December 25 were not

replaced with identical 9494-24 HDAs.
24 HDAs

replaced

free-of-charge

identical new 9494-24 HDAs.

(R. at 459.)

by Unisys

(R. at 620.)

were

The two 9494replaced

with

Plaintiff replaced the

seven 9494-24 HDAs with the comparable space on the newest model
HDA.

(R. at 459.)

The 9730 HDA was roughly half as expensive as
14

the older 9494-24.

(R. at 535. )

Plaintiff saved considerable

expense by purchasing the five smaller, faster, and cheaper No.
9730 HDAs to replace the seven failed 9494-24 HDAs not replaced
free-of-charge by Unisys.

(R. at 529, 531 and 534-535.) Mr. Brown

was aware of the decision by Unisys not to pay for replacement of
the five HDAs following Christmas 1991.

(R. at 530.)

Unisys did

charge Plaintiff for the HDAs damaged on December 25, but Mr. Brown
did not know what happened to the HDAs that were removed.

(R. at

555. )
Mr. Brown received two orders from Mr. Broadhead for 9730 or
9613 HDAs within one week of each other.

(R. at 536.)

Plaintiff

ordered replacement equipment from Mr. Brown that would have been
delivered within thirty days. (R. at 557) Trial Ex. 7 was an order
for five HDAs dated January 16, 1992.

(R. at 536.)

Ex. 7 was for

five of the newest model HDAs to replace the middle-aged HDAs that
were deemed

unrepairable

after the Christmas

air

conditioning

failure.

(R. at 537. ) The unit price for the replacement HDAs was

$22,706.

(R. at 539.)

Plaintiff's discount price for each of the

five HDAs was $19,300.

(R. at 539.)

Mr. Brown did not recall any

unusual price considerations given to Plaintiff to buy the newest
model.

(R. at 557-558.)

was $19,300.

Mr. Brown's only price for the 9730 HDAs

(R. at 547.)

in Ex. 7 was $96,300.

The total order at the discount price

(R. at 539.)
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Trial Ex. 8 was an order for two HDAs dated January 21, 1992.
(R. at 540.)
540.)

Ex. 8 was for two of the newest model HDAs.

The discount price was $19,300 per HDA and the total price

for the two HDAs was $38,600.
shipped to Plaintiff.

(R. at 540.)

(R. at 539-540)

Both orders were

It took seven of the newest

model HDAs to replace the five failed middle-aged HDAs.
542.)

(R. at

Plaintiff's approximate cost to replace the seven damaged

HDAs with the five newest models was $119,000.
Mr.

(R. at

Brown

approved

the

decision

to

(R. at 460-461.)

charge

transportation, but not labor and installation.

Plaintiff

for

(R. at 530-531 and

547. )
Trial Ex. 6 was a letter dated December 26, 1991, from Unisys
to Plaintiff.
December

25

(R. at 543.)
the

customer

In Ex. 6, Unisys described that on
service

engineer

noted

temperature in the computer had reached 95 degrees.

that
(Ex.

the
6.)

Unisys understood that these extreme environmental conditions were
due to an air conditioning malfunction in the computer room.

(Ex.

6. ) Unisys explained that hardware failures were not instantaneous
from

environmental

failed.

(Ex. 6.)

shock, but

already

three

9494-24 HDAs

had

Unisys expressly informed Plaintiff that because

the failure was environmental and not within the control of Unisys
"the repair or replacement of the damaged hardware is beyond the
scope of your Unisys Maintenance Agreement."
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(Ex. 6.)

"The cost

to replace or repair the units will be the responsibility of Alta
Health."

(Ex. 6.)

The HDA order in Exs. 6, 7, and 8 was the only

event where Unisys has charged any customer for the replacement of
HDAs.

(R. at 561. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The trial court failed to examine Plaintiff's evidence and

the inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff.

The directed verdict cannot be sustained where there is

any evidence that raises a question of material fact, no matter how
improbable,

the

testimonial

and

reasonableness

evidence

may

documentary
of

its

appear.

evidence

reliance

on

of

Plaintiff
its

presented

damages

Defendant's

and

the

negligent

misrepresentation.
2.

Plaintiff's evidence of damages was not speculative.

Plaintiff proved that nine heat-damaged computer components were
replaced with seven new-model components at a discount price of
$134,900.00.

Installation of the seven new-model components saved

Plaintiff at least $100,000.00 from the cost of replacement of the
destroyed

components with the same middle-aged

models.

Thus,

Plaintiff presented a rational basis to allow the jury to make a
reasonable estimate of Plaintiff's damages. Moreover, Plaintif was
not required to prove payment and would be entitled to nominal
damages regardless of any insufficient proof of actual damages.
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3.

The testimony by Plaintiff's employees that Defendant

negligently misrepresented that the air conditioning system was
fully

automatic

was not contradicted

by Defendant

at trial.

Plaintiff's reliance on Defendant's representation was reasonably
foreseeable,
conditioning

since

Defendant

expertise,

knew

that

Defendant

Plaintiff

had

had no air

performed

all

air

conditioning service and maintenance for ten years, communication
between the parties had always been informal, and Defendant had to
be

accurate

conditioning

in statements

to Defendant

contractor.

Whether

as a

Plaintiff's

commercial

air

reliance

was

reasonable is a prototypical jury question.
ARGUMENT I
WHEN THE EVIDENCE AND ALL INFERENCES ARE EXAMINED,
IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF, A QUESTION
OF FACT, EVEN IF IMPROBABLE, WAS RAISED BY PLAINTIFF
CONCERNING DAMAGES AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The trial court prevented any issues from going to the jury
and entered judgment as a matter of law. A directed verdict should
be used cautiously and sparingly.

A well-recognized alternative

for a trial court concerned with the sufficiency of a party's
evidence of damages is to allow the case to go to the jury, but
grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("J.N.O.V.") if the
jury awards speculative or uncertain damages.
The most recent decision involving entry of a directed verdict
is

Kleinert

v. Kimball

Elevator
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Co.. 905 P. 2d

at 297.

The

plaintiff claimed permanent injuries from an elevator that trapped
plaintiff and allegedly threw the plaintiff up and down for forty
minutes.

The supreme court reversed the entry of the directed

verdict in favor of the building owner.

The plaintiff's claim

against the owner was based on failure to repair. Hence, plaintiff
had the burden to show that the owner knew or should have known
that a dangerous condition existed and the owner had sufficient
time to take corrective action.

Id. at 300.

The supreme court

restated the appellate standard of review for a directed verdict:
On appeal from a directed verdict, "we must examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and
if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment
in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be
sustained." Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Rec. Ass'nr 845
P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Graystone Pinesf 652 P.2d
at 898). Where there is any evidence that raises a question
of material fact, no matter how improbable the evidence may
appear, judgment as a matter of law is improper. See Hill v.
Seattle First Nat'l Bankr 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992).
IxL, at 299.
Plaintiff's evidence of prior elevator problems consisted of
the testimony of two employees of the elevator company, several
persons who had been trapped in the elevator before plaintiff's
injury,

and

malfunctions.

copies

of

service

records

that

showed

numerous

The court, without making any conclusion as to the

weight and veracity of the evidence, concluded that the evidence
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was sufficient to raise a genuine question of material fact when
viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff.

Id, at 300.

Similarly, in Nay v. General Motors Corp.r 850 P.2d at 1260,
the court reversed a directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer
of

an

allegedly

defective

vehicle.

The

testimony

of

the

plaintiffs' experts, when all facts and inferences from the facts
were viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, established
a specific theory of the defect and causation of the vehicle crash.
"We refuse to prevent these issues from going to the jury when, as
here, there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
infer causation."

Id. at 1264 (citing Butterfield v. Okubor 831

P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992)).
In this case, when the evidence and all inferences from the
evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
testimony and exhibits prove that Plaintiff was damaged and that
Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendant's misrepresentation that
the auto switchover was operable.
For example, in the findings of fact, the trial court conceded
that the computer components had to be replaced and that these
components were damaged by high temperatures on December 25. Thus,
where there was any evidence presented by Plaintiff on the amount
of damages, no matter how improbable the evidence may appear,
Plaintiff was entitled to have the jury consider Plaintiff's claims
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for damages.

Similarly, upon admission of any evidence of the

reasonableness

of

Plaintiff's

reliance

on

Defendant's

misrepresentation that the switchover was automatic, no matter how
improbable the evidence appeared, Plaintiff was entitled to go to
the jury.

Defendant knew that Plaintiff had no experience in air

conditioning and, for ten years, had completely relied on Defendant
for all air conditioning service and maintenance.

For ten years

the parties communicated informally with each other in the hall or
offices without special meetings or transmission of documents back
and forth.

Mr. Loudon relied on the conversation that the auto

switchover system was working on December 25. Defendant's employee
knew, one week before Christmas, that Plaintiff understood the auto
switchover

was

fully

operational, but

Defendant

did

not

take

precautions or make efforts to communicate the progress of the auto
switchover system.

Indeed, Defendant's employee never advised

Plaintiff that the switchover was partially inoperable.
ARGUMENT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NOT OFFERED ANY
EVIDENCE IN ALLOWING A REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF DAMAGES
Plaintiff proved its damages with reasonable certainty and
with sufficient evidence to ensure that the jury would not have to
resort to speculation.

The evidence showed the amount of damages

and that Plaintiff's damages were caused by Defendant.
is

entitled

to

recover

full

compensation
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for

the

Plaintiff
losses

it

incurred.

The trial court erred when it concluded as a matter of

law that plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence for a
jury to determine damages.
In Price-Orem v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnellf 784 P.2d 475 (Utah
App.

1989), the defendant objected to admission of an appraisal

that used estimated income, not actual income.

Defendant claimed

plaintiff's evidence of income was insufficient to support the jury
verdict of damages.

The court held that the estimated

income

"evidence was not too speculative to support the damage award."
Id. at 479.
The court described the requisite proof to recover damages:
The objective in rendering an award of damages is to award the
injured party full compensation for actual losses incurred,
see Henderson v. For-Shor Co. f 757 P.2d 465, 469 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), by evaluating any loss "suffered by the most
direct, practical and accurate method that can be employed."
Even Odds. Inc. v. Nielsonr 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d 709, 711
(1968). It is well settled that, although the plaintiff has
the burden of proving the fact, causation, and amount of
damages, he need only do so with reasonable certainty rather
than with absolute precision. Canyon Country Store, 781 P.2d
at 418; Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co. r 722 P. 2d 773, 774 (Utah
1986) (per curiam); Anderson v. Bauer. 681 P. 2d 1316, 1323-25
(Wyo. 1984).
"[A]lthough damages may not be determined by
speculation or guesswork, evidence allowing a just and
reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data is
sufficient." National Steel Co. v. Great Lakes Towing Co. r
574 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 478.
The court concluded that the amount of damages may be based on
mere approximations, since "the level of certainty required to
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establish the amount of loss is generally lower than that required
to establish the fact of loss...."

Id. at 479 (citing Sampson v.

Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 (Utah App. 1989)); see also Broadway
Realty & Trust, Inc. v. Gouldf

136 Ariz. 236, 665 P.2d 580, 582

(Ariz. App. 1983) (once the right to damages was established,
uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude recovery).
The supreme court reached a similar result in Bastian v. Kingr
661 P. 2d 953 (Utah 1983).

The defendant contended that the damages

from defendantf s trespassing cattle were so speculative that there
was no rational basis in the evidence to support an award of $2,966
to plaintiff for damaged crops.

The case was remanded for further

findings, since the court was unable to determine how the trial
court calculated the value of the destroyed crops.

Id. at 957.

The supreme court ruled that speculative damages would be reversed,
but the general rule was that "some degree of uncertainty in the
evidence of damages will not suffice to relieve a defendant from
recompensing

a

wronged

plaintiff."

Id.

at

956.

The

court

concluded as follows:
As long as there is some rational basis for a damage award, it
is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty.
Winsness v, M.J. Conoco Distributors, Utah, 593 P. 2d 1303
(1979).
Where there is evidence of the fact of damage, a
defendant may not escape liability because the amount cannot
be proved with precision.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Plaintiff proved the fact, causation, and amount of damages by
the

most

direct,

practical,

and

accurate

method.

Plaintiff

established the fact of loss through the testimony of a number of
witnesses and exhibits.

First, the undisputed testimony of the

responsible Unisys engineer, corroborated by Mr. Loudon, was that
the high temperatures on December 25 caused the damage to the
middle-aged HDAs.

Second, the testimony of the employees of Unisys

and Plaintiff, including written service orders, shows that nine
heat-damaged HDAs were replaced with seven of the newest-model HDA.
All witnesses agreed that the replacement HDAs were shipped to
Plaintiff.

Indeed, the trial court's findings of fact concede that

HDAs had to be replaced after high-heat damage.
be no argument that Plaintiff was charged

Finally, there can

for service on HDAs

damaged by heat and that the charges were outside the parties?
maintenance agreement.
Disputed evidence concerning the amount of Plaintiff's loss is
part of the findings of fact.

The trial court found no evidence

that $19,300 per HDA charged by Unisys was a reasonable price, that
price

considerations

were

unspecified,

and

that

there was

no

evidence of the fair market value of the nine middle-aged HDAs
damaged by heat.

However, these findings involving the amount of

damages are subjected to a lower standard of proof.

Approximations

based on relevant data are allowed as long as the proof of the
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amount does not amount to speculation or guesswork.

Plaintiff's

proof of damages did not amount to speculation or guesswork.

The

opinions of Plaintiff's damages were just and reasonable estimates
based on relevant data.
There was no dispute that Plaintiff was charged $1,606.96 in
two Unisys customer service orders for service on heat-damaged
HDAs.

These service charges were not free-of-charge or under

warranty,

since the work was outside the parties' maintenance

agreement.

Plaintiff received a discount price on each new-model

HDA that was $3,400 less expensive than the regular unit price.

In

addition,

an

enormous

the
sum

installation
in replacement

of

the

newest-model

costs.

HDA

saved

The newest-model

HDA

was

roughly one-half as expensive as the middle-aged HDAs destroyed by
high temperatures.

Thus, replacement of the destroyed HDAs with

the newest-model HDAs saved Plaintiff at least $100,000.
The two orders by Plaintiff for seven new-model HDAs showed
that Unisys charged Plaintiff $134,900 for replacement HDAs at the
discount

price.

Unisys

shipped

the

orders

to

Plaintiff

Plaintiff was responsible for transportation expenses.

and

Unisys

employees testified that the discount price was the only price
Unisys had for the newest-model HDAs.
there

were

no other

Unisys replaced

price

Unisys employees testified

considerations

two other destroyed
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given

to

Plaintiff.

HDAs at its own expense.

Unisys had replaced all HDAs that failed in the years before 1992.
The seven new-model HDAs were not replaced by Unisys free-of-charge
or under warranty.

Unisys sent Plaintiff a written explanation of

why Unisys did and, for the first time, required Plaintiff to pay
for the damaged components.

Unisys stated that the high-heat

destruction was not within the control of Unisys and the damage was
beyond

the scope of the maintenance agreement.

Consequently,

replacement of the failed equipment was the sole responsibility of
Plaintiff.

The December 25 air conditioning failure was the only

event where Unisys charged any customer for replacement HDAs.
Plaintiff had to replace HDAs after Plaintiff's wrongful and
negligent conduct caused the computer room to be unmanned during an
air conditioning failure.

The undisputed evidence that Plaintiff

replaced the destroyed HDAs is sufficient to subject Defendant to
liability regardless of any imprecision concerning the amount of
damages.

Plaintiff is entitled to seek full compensation from the

jury for actual losses shown with just and reasonable estimates.
Plaintiff was entitled

to seek nominal damages under its

breach of contract claims regardless of whether it proved actual
damages.

Plaintiff

sought to recover damages

for

Defendant's

breach of contract or warranty and for negligent misrepresentation.
In the event Plaintiff failed to prove actual damages, Plaintiff
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was entitled to seek nominal damages from Defendant under its
breach of contract or warranty claims.
In Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, Inc.f 754 P. 2d 940
(Utah 1988), the tenant breached a commercial lease.

The trial

court awarded the landlord damages for the lost rent during the
fifteen months the premises were vacant. On appeal, the court held
that the premises had been relet at a rate double defendant's rent
and, under the terms of the lease, defendant's liability was zero.
"However, nominal damages are recoverable upon a breach of contract
if no actual damages resulted from the breach."

Id. at 942 (citing

Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667
(Utah 1982) ); see also Snyderville Trgtnsp. Co. v. Christiansen, 609
P.2d 939, 943 (Utah 1980) (juries may award nominal damages if
plaintiff fails to prove damages).
Assuming that Plaintiff failed to prove actual damages, the
claims for breach of contract or warranty would entitle Plaintiff
to seek nominal damages from Defendant. Hence, the alleged failure
to prove damages is not a proper ground for dismissal of a case by
directed verdict.

Of course, the charges for two service calls by

Unisys to repair failed equipment proved actual damages of at least
$1,606.96.

In

addition,

the

trial

court's

findings

of

fact

expressly concede that five to seven HDAs required replacement from
the high temperatures.

Plaintiff was charged for two orders of
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replacement HDAs shipped by Unisys to Plaintiff in the total sum of
$134,900.
the HDAs

For all prior HDA failures, Unisys had always replaced
free-of-charge.

However, Unisys

refused

to pay

for

replacement of the HDAs destroyed by high heat on December 25.
One of the trial court's findings of fact, No. 11, provides
that Plaintiff produced no evidence establishing that Plaintiff
ever paid for the replacement HDAs.
prove payment to recover damages.
have

to buy

replacement

Plaintiff does not

HDAs

Plaintiff is not required to

Indeed, Plaintiff does not even

to recover

damages, so

fail to mitigate its damages.

long

as

Failure to

mitigate cannot be an issue in this case, since Plaintiff saved
$100,000 by purchasing new-model HDAs.

Plaintiff is only required

to prove the fact that a loss occurred as a result of Defendant!s
wrongdoing and the amount of the loss.

Additionally, there are no

Utah decisions that make proof of payment a requisite element of
damages in a breach of contract or warranty case.
In Barilla v. Gunn Buick-Cadillac-GMCr Inc.f 139 Misc.2d 496,
528

N.Y.S.2d

273

(City

Ct.

1988),

the

court

ruled

that

the

plaintiff may recover the costs to repair a defective vehicle from
the dealer that sold the used car under a statutory warranty of
serviceability.

The plaintiff's repair costs were $1,075.87, since

"plaintiff was and is liable to pay that amount although she has
apparently not yet done so."

Id. at 280.
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The court was unaware

"of

any

requirement

that

prior

to

recovering

a

judgment,

a

plaintiff must actually pay the bills that are the subject of the
lawsuit."

Id.

"Indeed persons, sometimes indigent, frequently

recover awards for past and even future anticipated expenses which
they have not paid and sometimes cannot pay, and they recover their
j udgment."

Id.

In Coe v. Esaur 377 P.2d 815 (Okl. 1963), a service station
owner-operator

destroyed

plaintiff's

automobile

installation of a faulty oil-filter gasket.

engine

by

The proper measure of

damage for defendant's negligence was the cost of repair. However,
the plaintiff traded in the car with the damaged motor when he
acquired another vehicle. Plaintiff's car was not repaired and the
court held that it was "'not a condition precedent to recover for
items of damage for repairs that plaintiff should have actually
expended the sums of incurred liability therefor.'"

Id. at 820-21

(quoting Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Quailsr 120 Okl. 49, 250 P. 774
(1925)).
Similarly, in Hughes v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.r Inc.r 485 So.
2d 642 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986), the trial court awarded plaintiff
damages for mental suffering and repair costs for her car from
burning debris dropped by a transformer that exploded.

Defendant

argued that the plaintiff must first repair her# car before she was
entitled to recover a damage award.
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Id. at 643.

The court held

that "[a]n estimate of the cost of repair will support an award of
damages; it is not necessary that the damaged property be actually
repaired."

Id. (citations omitted).

There are no Utah cases that make proof of payment a requisite
element of damages in a tort action.

Of course, the custom and

practice in personal injury cases is to offer evidence of all
medical bills as proof of the amount of special damages.

In

personal injury actions, when medical bills have been paid, the
jury is not advised of payment as required by the collateral source
rule.

DuBois v. Nyer 584 P. 2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978).

Generally, no

evidence that medical bills are paid or unpaid is ever offered at
trial by the parties.

Of course, the amount paid may be some

evidence of the reasonable value of medical expenses.

Lawson v.

Safeway, Inc.r 878 P.2d 127, 131 (Colo. App. 1994).
Plaintiff was not required to offer evidence it paid Unisys
for the replacement HDAs to prove the fact of loss or amount of
damages.

Whether

or not Unisys has yet been paid makes not

difference in Plaintiff's right to recover damages from Defendant.
Plaintiff replaced nine HDAs, but the burden of proving damages did
not prescribe that Plaintiff even replaced the damaged equipment.
Nor did Plaintiff have to offer testimonial or documentary evidence
of payment, including canceled checks, receipts, or other bank
records to prove payment.

In the event Unisys did not obtain
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payment for the HDAs it shipped and installed for Plaintiff, for
whatever reason, Plaintiff should not be precluded from recovery of
damages caused by Defendant.
ARGUMENT III
WHETHER PLAINTIFF REASONABLY RELIED ON
DEFENDANT'S MISREPRESENTATION WAS A
PROTOTYPICAL QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY
The trial court's other erroneous conclusion of law was that
Plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to allow the jury
to find that the Plaintiff had "reasonably relied" upon Defendant's
negligent misrepresentation.
made

a

misrepresentation

to

There is no dispute that Defendant
Plaintiff.

All

of

Plaintiff's

employees testified that Defendant represented to Plaintiff that
the auto switchover was working on December 25.

By contrast,

Defendant's responsible employee could not recall if he represented
to Plaintiff that the auto switchover was completely operable.
Whether Plaintiff's reliance on Defendant's misrepresentation was
reasonable is question of fact for a jury.
In Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnellf 713 P.2d
55 (Utah 1986), the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's
claim against the engineering firm that had negligently staked the
shopping center developed by plaintiff.

The doctrine of negligent

misrepresentation was described as follows:
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[T]he tort ... provides that a party injured by reasonable
reliance upon a second party's careless or negligent
misrepresentation of a material fact may recover damages
resulting from that injury when the second party had a
pecuniary interest in the transaction, was in a superior
position to know material facts, and should have reasonably
foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely upon the
fact.
Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
Defendant was hired to survey and stake the property and "was
bound to do so with that degree of care and skill expected of
licensed

surveyors

and/or

engineers."

Id.

The

professional

expertise of the defendant entitled others to "reasonably rely"
upon the project engineer's information.

Id. at 59-60.

Plaintiff

"as the owner of the property for whose benefit the shopping center
was

being

reliance

constructed,

upon the accuracy

foreseen."

in

clearly

a party

whose

justifiable

of the survey might be

reasonably

Id. at 60.

Similarly,
mandated

was

reversal

this

case.

of

Plaintiff's

Defendant

was

directed
bound

to

verdict
perform

is
the

switchover project with the degree of care and skill expected of a
commercial air conditioning contractor.
performance

of

maintenance

and

all

Plaintiff's

Defendant's

air

Defendant's ten years of
conditioning

professional

service

expertise

and

entitled

Plaintiff to reasonably rely on Defendant's statements concerning
the switchover project. Defendant knew Plaintiff had no experience
in air conditioning and Plaintiff, as the owner, was clearly a
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party whose justifiable reliance upon the rirouracy of statements
" ' •»•

/as working was reasonably foreseeable.
: '*

recent

element

decision,

reasonable

Constr. r

the

court

reliance

further

the

Maack v. Resource Design
\r>n

Inc. r

interpreted

1QQ4).

&

The plaintiffs

appealed the dismissal of their claims against the seller's real
estate agent, Kesselring, who had represented that til :ie 11 esi dence
purchased by plciintiiis had a one-year builder's warranty

The

court relied 011 the Price-Orem factors to find that Kesselringfs
statement to plaintiffs was a misrepresentation, Kesselri ng had a
peon m a r y

nil o 1 es t • 11 11 u - transaction, and Kesselring was in a

superior position to know material facts.

Id. at 576.

"The key

question, however, is whether the Maacks * reliance 01 1 Kessel 1: I ng's
rai srepresentat i 01» wau reasonable."

Id. (emphasis in original).

The court of appeals noted that the supreme court has only
required proof of reasonable reliance, not
elemen
Oremr

.

.srepresentation.

713 P. 2d at 59).

diligi

Id. at ^ 7 7 (citing Price-

The court explained that in Schuhman v.

Green River Motel. 835 P.2d 992 (Utah App. 1992),
appeals

had

criticized

the

requirement

of due diligence i:

negligent misrepresentation claim, since "the supreme court had
required only reasonable reliance."

Id. at D//

n. 5.

The court

conceded tha t: (in le diligence may be a higher standard of proof than

33

reasonable reliance.

Id.

"However, they both impose some standard

of care on one claiming to be a victim of misrepresentation."
The

court

held

misrepresentation
"reliance

on

that

to

bring

a

successful

Kesselring's

court

negligent

claim plaintiffs must demonstrate that their
statement

without

some

investigation was reasonable under the circumstances."
The

Id.

affirmed

that

plaintiffs1

further

Id. at 577.
negligent

misrepresentation cause was properly dismissed by summary judgment.
Id.

The court concluded that plaintiffs did not reasonably rely on

the Kesselring's statement where plaintiffs failed to ask the scope
of coverage under the warranty, did not review the warranty, did
not refer to the warranty

in the purchase agreement, did not

inquire as to the expiration date, and plaintiff was an experienced
attorney who should have known the terms of an "as is" sale.

Id.

In this case, Plaintiff had no employees with experience or
knowledge of air conditioning.

Defendant had a strong pecuniary

interest in the switchover project and was in a position where it
had exclusive knowledge concerning the status and nature of the
work.

Proof of due diligence was unnecessary for Plaintiff to

recover damages.

Plaintiff must merely prove that Mr. Loudon's

reliance on Defendant's representation that the auto switchover was
operable was reasonable and required no further investigation. Mr.
Loudon relied on Defendant's misrepresentation that the switchover
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was

operational.

invest igat i.on

Plaintiff's

' hw

i easonable

reliance,

where

without

Plaintiff

had

further
relied

on

informal conversations with Defendant during the preceding ten
years of air conditioning service and maintenance,
N
after

Adda tionally,

. lish J r lves tigated the switchover a week before December 25,
e was surprised to learn that the project was unfinished,

and Mr. English was told by the Defendant that the project was 95
to 99 percei I t compi e te

Mr. English asked wheher he should advise

Messrs. Broadhead or Loudon that the auto switchover was partially
inoperable, but Defendant reassured Mr. English tt lat the computer
room iii»irid(|oiiieiit wnnOlil t»e informed that the switchover would not
work during power outages.
room managment that
oi itages.

Mr

Defendant never explained to computer

t he switchover would not wor k di lr i ng

Loudon

relied

o n the informal

conversation

power
with

Defendant concerning the progress of the air conditioning project
just a s h e had for many years prior to December 1991.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's evidence of damages was not so imprecise that the
jury would have been required to speculate oi cjuess.

P] ai riti ff

offered sul f icient evidence that Plaintiff incurred $134,900.00 in
damages and $1,606.96 for service work to replace the nine HDAs
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destroyed from high-heat on December 25, 1991. Indeed, Plaintiff's
evidence was that it saved

$100,000 by ordering

seven of the

newest-model HDAs to replace the nine destroyed HDAs.
Plaintiff relied on the accuracy of Defendant's representation
that the automatic switchover was fully operational.
reliance was probable and reasonably foreseeable.

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff had

relied on Defendant's statements concerning service and maintenance
work for many years before December 25, 1991.
Plaintiff

did

not

have

any

expertise

in

Defendant knew that
air

conditioning.

Defendant was expected to make representations in accordance with
the

degree

of

care

and

conditioning contractor.
understand

skill

expected

of

a

commercial

air

Defendant knew that Plaintiff did not

that the auto switchover was fully operable a week

before December 25, 1991, yet assured Plaintiff that Defendant
would keep the computer room management informed of the progress of
the work.
When

Plaintiff's

evidence

of

damages

and

reliance

on

Defendant's negligent misrepresentation is examined, in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the directed verdict was improperly
granted.

Plaintiff raised questions of material fact, no matter

how improbable, that should have been considered by the jury.
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THEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the directed
verdict be reversed and this action \iv remanded for trial.

DATED this

(S
\J>

day of May, 1996.

J J^Angus Edwards
PURSER EDWARDS & SHIELDS, L.L.C.
800 Parkside Tower
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2340
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

IS

day of May, 1996, I caused

four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to
be served upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in the
United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
John L. Young
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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ADDENDUM

JOHN L. YOUNG [A3591]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone:
(801) 531-2000
Fax No.:
(801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

;

f

ALTA HEALTH STRATEGIES, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER DIRECTING
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT

CCI MECHANICAL SERVICE, a
Division of CCI Mechanical,
Inc., a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 930903151PP

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis,
on August 7, 1995, said matter being tried to a jury, duly chosen and seated in accordance with
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff, Alta Health Strategies was represented by J. Angus
Edwards of Purser & Edwards; the defendant, CCI Mechanical Service was represented by John
L. Young of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson.

-2Upon the conclusion of the plaintiffs case on August 8, 1995, the defendant made
a motion for directed verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
The Court, having considered the defendant's motion, the evidence presented by
the plaintiff, the pleadings and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the
premises, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directed
Verdict.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

As of December 25, 1991, CCI Mechanical Service [HCCIM] was

constructing and installing certain alterations on the air conditioning system and equipment at
the Alta Health Strategies, Inc. ["Alta Health"] computer facility pursuant to a written contract.
2.

On December 25, 1991, between the hour of 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.,

an event occurred at the Alta Health computer facility causing the air conditioning system to
stop.
3.

Russell Loudon, an employee of Alta Health, was the manager of the

Computer Operations Center, charged with overseeing all computer operations for Alta Health.
He entered the computer room sometime between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., on December 25,
1991, and discovered that the temperature in the computer room had reached 95° fahrenheit.
4.

Upon subsequent evaluation of the computer room equipment, Alta Health

and Unisys, Inc., the computer equipment supplier and maintenance contractor, determined that
five to seven head disk assemblies [ M HDAV] required replacement.
5.
Model 9494-24 unit.

The HDA's requiring replacement were all associated with the Unisys
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6.

The Model 9494-24 HDA's requiring replacement were not replaced by

Alta Ikalili .ind Unisys with the same model, but were replaced with new model 9730 Unisys
units.
7.

The quoted replacement cost by Unisys for the Unisys model 9494-24

HDA was $19,300.00 per unit.
8

The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence as to whether the Unisys

replacement price of $19,300.00 for each Model 9494-24 HDA \v;i\ a "reasonable price."
9.

In the transaction for replacement of the Model 9494-24 units with the new

Unisys Model 9730 \iitits, Unisys graiited unspecified price concessions for the conversion to the
new Model 9730 units.
10.

: n? *

no evidence as to the extent or amount of the price

concessions given to Alta Health for the conversion to the Model 9730 units.
rhe plaintiff introduced no evidence establishing that Alta Health ever paid
any amount for the replacement of the 9494-24 HDA's allegedly damaged on December 25,
1991, with the new Model 9730 units.
12.

The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence as to the age of the 9494-24

HDA's that were damaged on December 25, 1991; failed to establish the date that such HDA's
were placed into service; failed to

IIIIIUMIIKT

anv in'idnuT tli.il such HDA's vine noil exposed

to environmental contamination, admittedly present in the Alta Health computer facility during
Ihr )'VM IW1, .nn* tailed In i.ifhM'luu .my rudeiki" as It* the fair market value of the Model
9494-24 HDA's immediately before the incident, that were replaced with the new Model 9730
Units.
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13.

The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence as to the difference in fair

market value between the Unisys Model 9494-24 HDA's damaged and the fair market value of
the Model 9730 HDA's that replaced the 9494-24 HDA's.
14.

The air conditioning system at the Alta Health Computer facility was not

serviced by any auxiliary power supply. The sole power supply was from the main public utility
service.
15.

The Alta Health computer system was supplied with electrical power by

the main public utility service and with an auxiliary "uninterrupted power supply" ["UPS"]
system, which provided electrical power in the event of a main power supply failure.
16.

As of December 25, 1991, Alta Health employees knew that the air

conditioning system was not serviced by any alternative power source.
17.

Prior to December 25, 1991, and subsequent to December 25, 1991, Alta

Health manned the computer room facility 24-hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year.
18.

Part of the work being performed by CCI at Alta Health as of December

25, 1991, included the modification and alteration of an "automatic switching system" that would
allow the air conditioning system to automatically restart when the main electrical power was
restored following a main electrical power outage. Russell Loudon and Kent Broadhead, Alta
Health employees, knew that the air conditioning contract work being performed by CCI was
incomplete on December 25, 1991.
19.

Although Russell Loudon testified

that he "understood" from a

conversation with a CCI employee, either Greg Porter or George Murdoch, that the automatic
switching system was operational as of December 25, 1991, he knew that the new electrical
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control panel, with the air conditioning system indicator lights, was not installed.

Prior to

December 25, 1991, Russell Loudon did not inquire of any CCI employee regarding how the
system would indicate that the automatic switching mechanism was working, or how the new
system would work, or what the computer operators were to do regarding monitoring the new
system, except that he knew there would be new indicator lights on the new electrical control
panel when it was installed that would indicate which chillers were working.
20.

The automatic switching system was not operational as of December 25,

21.

Kent Broadhead and Russell Loudon decided to leave the Alta Health

1991.

computer facility unmanned on December 25, 1991, with employees only periodically checking
on the system.
22.

Alta Health failed to introduce any evidence that Kent Broadhead had any

conversations with any CCI employee to determine whether the automatic switching mechanism
was operational as of December 25, 1991.
23.

As of December 25, 1991, Kent Broadhead and Russell Loudon,

employees of Alta Health, knew that

electrical power outage, the

computer system would be powered for 30-45 minutes by an alternative power source from the
UPS system.
24.

As of December 25, 1991, Kent Broadhead knew that in the event a main

electrica1 power failure occurred and

r system power system was consumed, the multi-

million dollar Alta Health Computer System would sustain a catastrophic failure.

-625.

Alta Health introduced no evidence to establish reasonable reliance to

support its "understanding" that the automatic switch-over mechanism was complete as of
December 25, 1991, or that such "understanding" could justify leaving the Alta Health Computer
Center unattended on December 25, 1991.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters its conclusions of
law.
1.

The plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence from which the jury

could determine the damages, if any, that the plaintiff allegedly sustained.
2.

The plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find

that the plaintiff had "reasonably relied" upon any negligent misrepresentation allegedly made
by the defendant.
DIRECTED VERDICT
The Court, based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
hereby directs that a verdict be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, no
cause of action.

The defendant is awarded its costs incurred herein, and shall submit an

Affidavit of Costs, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

3

day of

N^v^r^e^

, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

M
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

-7CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY tbt& z true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was hand
delivered, this $-£ day of HdWlMfiLwA
1995, to the following:
' J . Angus Edwards, Esq.
800 Parkside Tower
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff

